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Abstract Are certain forms of government associated with superior economic outcomes? 
This paper attempts to answer that question by examining how government systems inlu-
ence macroeconomic performance. We ind that presidential regimes consistently are asso-
ciated with less favorable outcomes than parliamentary regimes: slower output growth, 
higher and more volatile inlation and greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the efect is sizable. For example, annual output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percent-
age points lower and inlation is estimated to be at least four percentage points higher under 
presidential regimes relative to those under parliamentary ones. The diference in distribu-
tional outcomes is even starker; income inequality is 12 to 24% worse under presidential 
systems.
Keywords Constitutional economics · Form of government · Economic growth · 
Inlation · Income inequality
JEL classiication E02 · H11 · P16
1 Introduction
The proliferation of independent nations following the demise of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s revitalized the debate on constitutional rules, in particular on the forms of gov-
ernment.1 In his seminal paper, Linz (1990) argued that presidential regimes—wherein the 
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1 The origins of the debate on the implications of the form of constitutions date back much earlier. Both 
Walter Bagehot and Woodrow Wilson wrote on the ideal forms of constitutional structure in 1867 and 1885, 
respectively (see Elgie 2005). The readers of this journal will know that modern constitutional political 
economy originated in Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
 Public Choice
1 3
president is the chief executive oicer and is elected by popular vote—are less conducive to 
stable democracy than parliamentary regimes, pointing to the ‘perils of presidentialism’ on 
two grounds.2 First, in presidential systems both the president and the assembly compete 
for legitimacy, frequently leading to divided government, with serious implications for the 
stability of democratic systems. Second, presidential regimes are associated with signii-
cant rigidity owing to both the single person nature of the oice and the ixed terms associ-
ated with it. In contrast, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) assert that presidential regimes 
also have advantages that may counterbalance some of their handicaps. For example, it is 
argued that presidential systems ofer greater choice to the electorate who cast votes both 
for the chief executive and the legislative assembly. In addition, it is suggested that a more 
direct link exists between the choices made at the ballot box and the electoral outcomes 
under presidentialism, in contrast to parliamentary systems in which coalition formation 
may weaken that link, reducing accountability under the latter. Hence, Mainwaring and 
Shugart (1997) conclude that presidential regimes perform better where presidents have 
weaker legislative powers and when the political party system is not overly fragmented.
The work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) (PT, hereafter) on the economic efects of 
constitutions has changed the direction of the debate, initiating a new literature on the 
implications of political institutions for economic outcomes. By exploring both the form of 
government and electoral rules on macroeconomic outcomes, PT uncovered well-deined 
relationships between presidential versus parliamentary regimes and the size and the 
composition of government spending, budget deicits, output per worker and total factor 
productivity. In particular, they ind that presidential regimes are associated with smaller 
governments, lower welfare spending, lower productivity and more pronounced electoral 
cycles.
A substantial part of the ensuing research efort aimed toward a re-examination of the 
impact of constitutional rules—regarding both the type of regime (presidential versus par-
liamentary) and electoral systems (majoritarian versus proportional representation)—on 
the size of government and the composition of public spending. For example, Blume et al. 
(2009) ind that having a presidential rather than a parliamentary regime has no statistically 
signiicant efect on either the size of the government, the scale of corruption, output per 
worker, or total factor productivity.3 In contrast, Gregorini and Longoni (2009), by incor-
porating a large set of political and demographic factors, conirm PT’s inding of pres-
idential regimes being associated with smaller governments. Similarly, by reining PT’s 
measurements and methodology, Rockey (2012) re-establishes the negative and signiicant 
impact of presidential regimes on the size of government. Interestingly, and in line with 
Blume et al. (2009), Rockey (2012) shows that the relationship disappears when the sample 
is extended to contain the new democracies of the 1990s.
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether certain forms of government are associated 
with better macroeconomic performance, a topic that has received much less attention in 
the existing literature. Even though the size of government, the scale of corruption and the 
composition of public spending (as studied in the existing literature) are important dimen-
sions of policy outcomes, those variables would not form the standard set of macroeco-
nomic performance indicators. Two exceptions to the above-mentioned studies explore the 
role of constitutions on economic growth: while Gerring et al. (2009) ind a negative role 
3 Blume et al. (2009) extend the PT sample by including 31 additional countries that held free elections in 
the 1990s.
2 See Carey (2008) for a comparative analysis of presidential versus parliamentary government.
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of presidentialism on GDP per capita, Knutsen (2009), in an extended sample, inds no 
relationship between the form of government and economic growth.4
In this paper we explore the role of regime type on output and the volatility of output, 
inlation and the volatility of inlation, examining links that largely are unexplored in the 
existing literature.5 In addition to those four indicators, we extend our analysis to the link 
between regime type and income inequality. The reasons for including income inequality in 
our analysis are twofold. First, the level of inequality is an important determinant of politi-
cal and economic instability with major implications for macroeconomic performance, 
as widely documented (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti 1996; Campos and Nugent 
2002). Second, a steady rise in income inequality has been observed almost universally, 
reaching record levels at present, which makes it crucial to understand its potential sources 
(OECD 2015).6
In order to systematically link macroeconomic outcomes to the form of government, 
we utilize an annual dataset for 119 countries over the 1950–2015 period and construct an 
extensive set of performance indicators. We then formally examine the implications of the 
government system on each of those outcomes. Our indings clearly point to compelling 
advantages of parliamentary systems. For example, we ind that countries run by presi-
dential regimes consistently exhibit slower output growth, higher and more volatile inla-
tion as well as greater income inequality relative to those under parliamentary regimes. 
Importantly, we ind that the diferences between the outcomes under the two systems are 
sizable: for example, the gap between annual output growth under presidential regimes 
relative to parliamentary ones varies between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points. Similarly, in 
countries run by presidential systems inlation is estimated to be at least four percentage 
points higher than in those under parliamentary regimes. The diference in distributional 
outcomes is even starker; the distribution of income is between 12 and 24% more unequal 
under presidential systems.
A common concern in analyses of the link between institutional structure—including 
the form of government—and economic outcomes is the potential endogeneity of institu-
tions. For example, it may be the case that constitutional forms are determined by eco-
nomic conditions, such that the causal direction of the relationship between the govern-
ment system and economic outcomes will not be straightforward. In light of such widely 
acknowledged endogeneity concerns, we subject our results to a battery of robustness 
checks as well as a number of remedial actions including instrumental variables estima-
tion and the Heckman correction procedure. We show that our main indings regarding the 
role of the form of government on economic performance remain intact in a wide range of 
alternative speciications.
4 John Carey also related economic outcomes to constitutional regimes, although less formally, in his key-
note address to the Conference on Coalitional Presidentialism at St Antony’s College, Oxford, on May 2, 
2014. In his analysis, Carey inspects a set of outcomes such as wealth, economic inequality, poverty mitiga-
tion, corruption, the homicide rate, rule of law and accountability across presidential versus other regimes.
5 Indeed, the basis of the loss function widely utilized in the policy games literature is the policymaker’s 
aversion to high and volatile inlation as well as to low and volatile output. See, for example, Barro and 
Gordon (1983), among many others. More recently, Woodford (2003) shows that such a framework is a 
good approximation for policymaking in much richer models with microfoundations.
6 It is now believed widely that the substantial deterioration in income inequality was a key factor in a 
number of recent electoral surprises, including the United Kingdom’s referendum in June 2016 to leave the 
European Union, the presidential elections in the United States in November 2016, as well as the recent par-
liamentary elections in the United Kingdom in June 2017 (see, for example, Bell and Machin 2016).
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What are the policy implications of examining the role of government systems on eco-
nomic performance? Although constitutions remain in place for long periods of time, 
countries periodically consider constitutional amendments, including changes in the sys-
tem of governance. Indeed, Hayo and Voigt (2010) identify 123 changes in the form of 
government in 169 countries from 1950 to 2003. Their evidence includes ten post-Soviet 
Union countries moving from presidential to parliamentary systems in the 1990s as well as 
ten countries in North Africa and Middle East that switched their regimes in the opposite 
direction. More recently, France has made changes to its constitution in the direction of a 
parliamentary system (see, for example, Rogof 2011). Similarly, constitutional reform has 
been on the agenda in a number of countries in the Middle East since the widespread pro-
tests, referred to as the Arab Spring, starting in 2011. Also, at present, Turkey is in transi-
tion from its current parliamentary system into a presidential one, following a referendum 
in April 2017, while widespread protests have arisen in Venezuela and Poland recently 
over proposed constitutional changes. We believe that establishing the link between forms 
of government and economic outcomes serves a signiicant purpose by providing an 
important piece of information for constitutional framers in countries considering regime 
changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, the 
data and descriptive statistics. Our formal empirical results are presented and examined in 
Sect. 3, which also contains our treatment of potential endogeneity issues, along with some 
additional robustness checks. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.
2  Estimation strategy and data
2.1  Methodology
To assess the role of the form of government on macroeconomic performance, we estimate 
the following cross-country panel regressions:
where Yi,t represents the dependent variable of interest (levels and volatility of economic 
growth and inlation, as well as income inequality) in country i in period t, Presi,t and Maji,t 
are measures representing the form of government and voting rule, respectively, and Xi,t 
are a set of control variables, speciic to the dependent variable in each case. Although our 
focus is on the form of government, it has been shown that voting rules also matter for eco-
nomic outcomes; as such, we include variables for both types of constitutional rules (see, 
for example, PT; Blume et al. 2009; Rockey 2012).
We estimate regressions of speciication (1) using generalized least squares with ran-
dom efects and time dummies for each period. As a benchmark, we utilize 15-year hori-
zons for each panel (as is common in the literature), starting from 1965, thus providing 
three (unbalanced) panels for each country in the regression.7 For each regression, three 
speciications are estimated incorporating three alternative sets of control variables in Xi,t: 
irst, a regression with no control variables; second, a speciication with a limited number 
of control variables and, third, one with an extended set of regressors. As collinearity exists 
(1)Yi,t = 훼 + 휃Presi,t + 훾Maji,t + 훽Xi,t + zi,t,
7 Starting the time horizons in 1965 maximizes the number of observations with 15-year panels. Sensitivity 
to that starting date is examined.
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between the form of government and other independent variables entered into the regres-
sions, this sequential process will aid further understanding of the results.
2.2  Data and constitutional variables
We use data from a variety of empirical sources as discussed in "Appendix 1", which pro-
vides a full description of all variables; where available, all data are collected over the 
1950–2015 period. We utilize two data sources for our measures of the form of govern-
ment, each employing subtly diferent deinitions. The irst is from Bormann and Golder 
(2013) (BG, hereafter), who deine presidential systems as those wherein the head of state 
cannot be removed by the elected assembly, as proposed by Cheibub et al. (2010). In addi-
tion, a country wherein a popularly elected president can be removed by the assembly is 
classiied as operating in a ‘semi-presidential’ regime. All other regimes are parliamentary. 
PT follow a similar methodology, classifying a parliamentary government as one that can 
be subject to a conidence vote; correspondingly, a system for which a conidence vote is 
lacking is deined as a presidential government.8 Table 1 illustrates the countries catego-
rized into each form of government by the two data sources; as is observed from the table, 
the only diferences between the two sources are with respect to the ‘semi-presidential’ 
classiication and the data coverage. The underlying classiication of regimes into presiden-
tial, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes also is presented geographically in Fig. 3 
in the "Appendix 1".
2.3  Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the full sample means for each of the ive dependent variables in our anal-
ysis, under presidential and parliamentary systems, based on both the BG and PT classii-
cations. As can be seen, in a great majority of the cases average macroeconomic outcomes 
are more favorable under parliamentary regimes relative to those under presidential ones, 
and the diferences between the two systems frequently are statistically signiicant. Using 
the lower end of our estimates, on average, parliamentary countries grow 0.7 percentage 
points per annum faster than the presidential ones; have 4.6 percentage points lower inla-
tion; have smaller variations in inlation; and have less income inequality.9 As is also clear 
from Table 2, the disparities in macroeconomic outcomes are larger and more statistically 
signiicant when using the PT deinition of forms of government; those diferences stem 
from PT’s smaller sample and are not explained by diferences in country classiications 
between the two presidential variables.
Figure 1 presents histograms for our ive performance indicators under both parliamen-
tary and presidential regimes. It is observed that for every macroeconomic outcome, with 
the exception of growth volatility, the better performance of parliamentary regimes relative 
to presidential ones is consistent throughout the sample and is not driven by outliers.
Figure 2 presents scatter plots for countries along the metrics for which the diferences 
reported in Table 2 are statistically signiicant. In each plot, a point represents a country 
and solid lines illustrate the median value for each of the macroeconomic outcomes. In the 
8 PT discuss two dimensions across which they see presidential systems being deined: that of the coni-
dence vote and that of the separation of powers between the president and the legislature.
9 To remove the impact of inlation outliers, we use the method applied in Cukierman et al. (1992), wherein 
the GDP delator, π, is transformed using π/(1 + π).
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Table 1  Countries and forms of government classiication
Classiications of countries by form of government between the two data sets
BG PT
Presidential Parliamentary Not included
Presidential Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi, Mexico, Nica-
ragua, Peru, Philippines, Paraguay, El Salvador, 
Switzerland, Uganda, Uruguay, United States of 
America, Venezuela
Benin, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Cuba, Indone-
sia, Kenya, Liberia, Maldives, Micronesia, Nigeria, 
Palau, Panama, Sierra Leone, Suriname
Semi-presidential Sri Lanka Austria, Bulgaria, Comoros, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Iceland, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Taiwan, 
Ukraine
Armenia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Croatia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Lith-
uania, Madagascar, Macedonia, Mali, Mongolia, 
Mauritania, Niger, Serbia, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Timor-Leste
Parliamentary Australia, Belgium, The Bahamas, Bangla-
desh, Belize, Barbados, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, St. Vincent and the Gren-
adines, United Kingdom
Andorra, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bhutan, 
Czechoslovakia, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, Lao PDR, Lebanon, St. 
Lucia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Moldova, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Solomon Islands, San 
Marino, Somalia, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Not included The Gambia, Belarus, Namibia, Russia, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe
Botswana, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa
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Table 2  Presidential and parliamentary regimes: descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics based on whole sample averages. For each of the ive variables represented in the irst 
column, the mean is calculated under both presidential (‘Pres’) and parliamentary (‘Parl’) regimes, with 
both the standard deviation (in parentheses) and number of observations presented underneath. In the fourth 
and seventh columns the diference between these two means are presented, with p values from t-tests pre-
sented underneath (in parentheses). A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing 
signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Both BG and PT are used in classifying presidential versus 
parliamentary regimes; in the case of the former, semi-presidential systems are not included in the analysis
BG PT
Pres Parl Dif Pres Parl Dif
Annual GDP growth 1.680 2.342 0.662** 1.782 2.527 0.745***
(1.131) (1.437) (0.012) (1.182) (1.284) (0.009)
33 56 32 51
Growth volatility 4.523 4.359 − 0.164 3.973 3.668 − 0.305
(2.764) (2.351) (0.773) (1.465) (1.451) (0.358)
33 56 32 51
Inlation 0.108 0.065 − 0.044*** 0.142 0.070 − 0.072***
(0.076) (0.056) (0.004) (0.096) (0.054) (0.000)
33 56 32 51
Inlation volatility 0.106 0.060 − 0.046*** 0.133 0.065 − 0.068***
(0.078) (0.069) (0.003) (0.088) (0.057) (0.000)
33 56 32 51
Gini coeicient 45.333 36.789 − 8.543*** 48.208 37.265 − 10.943***
(7.312) (7.410) (0.000) (7.523) (5.974) (0.000)
22 37 32 51
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
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Fig. 1  Presidential and parliamentary regimes: macroeconomic outcomes. Histograms illustrating the dis-
tribution of our macroeconomic indicators of interest as an average over the whole sample (1950–2015) 
across parliamentary and presidential regimes using BG classiication for government structures
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left-hand panel of Fig. 2 the top-left quadrant represents those countries of above-average 
economic growth and below-average income inequality. In this good-outcomes quadrant, 
91% of countries are parliamentary, representing half of all parliamentary countries. In the 
bottom-right quadrant, representing worse than average outcomes for economic growth and 
inequality, 61% are presidential countries, representing half of all presidential countries.
Similar results are found in the right-hand panel wherein the best outcomes are those 
found in the bottom-left quadrant, namely, below-average levels and volatilities of inlation. 
In that quadrant 80% are parliamentary countries (nearly half of all parliamentary coun-
tries), whereas in the opposing top-right quadrant 48% of observations are from presiden-
tial countries (representing 63% of all presidential countries).
3  Forms of government and macroeconomic outcomes
In this section, we present and discuss the efects of the government systems on ive sepa-
rate outcome measures, as set out above. They are each taken in turn and are based on 
empirical results from estimating speciication (1).
3.1  Endogeneity concerns
An important issue in identifying the efects of constitutional rules on macroeconomic 
outcomes is related to the potential endogeneity of political institutions. The concern is 
that economic conditions could inluence the choice of constitutional forms and, thus, the 
causal direction of outcomes is not straightforward. Such endogeneity issues arise from 
two main sources: irst, the limited in-country variation between forms of government 
means that statistical inference is based on cross-country analysis; second, any decision 
on the form of government is unlikely to be truly exogenous to the political and economic 
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Fig. 2  Presidential and parliamentary regimes: macroeconomic outcomes. Scatter plots illustrating speciic 
country outcomes across our macroeconomic indicators of interest as an average over the whole sample 
(1950–2015) for parliamentary and presidential regimes using BG classiication for government structures. 
The solid lines in each plot represent median outcomes for each metric across all countries
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climate of the country.10 Applying ordinary least squares estimation relies on conditional 
independence, that is, the selection of the form of government is assumed to be random 
after controlling for all other variables [X in (1)]. Following PT, we take two remedial 
actions: instrumental variables estimation and the Heckman correction procedure.
3.1.1  Instrumental variables
The most widely used strategy in the face of potential endogeneity concerns is instrumental 
variables. In that approach, the bias caused by the selection of the form of government in a 
given country being non-random is irst estimated prior to estimating the size of the coef-
icient θ in (1). We follow PT in selecting our set of instruments: variables indicating the 
time when a country’s current constitutional form was adopted (using dummy variables for 
periods before 1920, between 1921 and 1950, between 1951 and 1980, and beyond 1981); 
the age of democracy within a given country (measured as the length of time in which 
the Polity database score of a country consecutively has been positive); language variables 
representing Western inluences in the country; and the country’s latitude.11 Furthermore, 
similar to PT and Rockey (2012) we apply the same instruments for the Heckman correc-
tion procedure, explained below.
Acemoglu (2005) argues that the chosen variables make for weak instruments, as the 
constitutional timing variables have limited statistical signiicance and the main deter-
minants are the Hall and Jones (1999) variables of language and latitude, variables that 
Acemoglu (2005) argues are not convincing instruments for constitutional features. Rockey 
(2012) reines the constitutional timing variables to gain more explanatory power for the 
form of government in two ways: one set of variables are for when a country genuinely 
holds a democratic election within a given constitutional framework (and not just when the 
constitution becomes law), and a second set of dummy variables indicating when a coun-
try’s constitution is promulgated. Rockey (2012) demonstrates that those factors provide 
better instruments for the form of government.
Our approach is to consider three separate sets of instruments, using the constitutional 
timing dummies as in PT, as well as the two sets of timing dummies from Rockey (2012); 
all sets of instruments also include the age of democracy, language variables and the coun-
try’s latitude. Table  3 reports results from irst-stage estimates using those three sets of 
instruments. All have signiicant explanatory power, with irst stage F-tests in excess of 30, 
and even when only the constitutional variables are considered, values of over ten typically 
are present.
Our strategy throughout the paper is to present results from a panel regression applying 
generalized least squares and, subsequently, similar estimates from applying both instru-
mental variables and the Heckman correction procedure. For the latter two, our benchmark 
instruments will be the constitutional timing variables from PT, as they provide the most 
consistent performances from the irst-stage regressions for both institutional timing and 
11 A full list and deinitions of the variables in our analysis can be found in "Appendix 1".
10 On the other hand, evidence on the insigniicant inluences of economic variables on the form of govern-
ment comes from Hayo and Voigt (2010), who present a comprehensive analysis of the sources of consti-
tutional changes. They ind that changes in the form of government—in either direction—are inluenced by 
political factors, such as the characteristics of the political system, political leaders and political conlict, 
but not economic and sociodemographic factors.
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Table 3  Instruments for the form of government
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Results from irst stage regressions of the proposed instruments for the form of gov-
ernment. The irst column represents the set of constitutional timing variables used as instruments (in conjunction with latitude and language instruments): PT being those constitutional dummies used 
in PT; and ‘Rockey promulgated’ and ‘Rockey elections’ representing similar timing dummy variables from Rockey (2012) when a constitution was promulgated and when free elections were held, 
respectively. The instrument set are deined as follows: con81, con5081 and con2150 refer to dummies representing that the constitution in the relevant country was adopted after 1981; between 1950 and 
1981 and between 1921 and 1950, respectively. EurFrac and EngFrac are the fractions of the population speaking one of the European languages and English, respectively. Latitude denotes the latitude 
of the capital city, and DemAge is the length of time over which the country in question has been operating in a democracy. FrankRom is the trade share of the economy from Frankel and Romer (1996). 
Each set of instruments are tested to determine how well they it our three measures of forms of government: the scale variable using the classiication from BG where semi-presidential regimes score 
0.5, presidential regimes 1, and zero otherwise; the dummy variable classiication using BG (BGd); and PT classiication. The bottom three rows display F-test statistics on the irst stage regression for 
all instruments (‘F-test all’); for just the constitutional timing variable (‘F-test gov’); as well as the R2 statistic from the irst stage regression
PT Rockey promulgated Rockey elections
BGs BGd PT BGs BGd PT BGs BGd PT
con81 0.313*** 0.178** 0.136** 0.053 0.040 0.064 − 0.123 − 0.309*** − 0.335***
(0.000) (0.014) (0.043) (0.498) (0.625) (0.407) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000)
con5081 − 0.055 − 0.138** − 0.258*** 0.032 0.009 − 0.115 − 0.072 − 0.205*** − 0.237***
(0.420) (0.048) (0.000) (0.702) (0.918) (0.164) (0.354) (0.009) (0.002)
con2150 − 0.020 − 0.155** − 0.127** 0.400*** 0.331*** 0.325*** 0.200 − 0.025 − 0.061
(0.763) (0.025) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.767) (0.479)
EurFrac 0.549*** 0.503*** 0.472*** 0.568*** 0.524*** 0.480*** 0.531*** 0.490*** 0.488***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EngFrac − 0.770*** − 0.806*** − 0.799*** − 0.767*** − 0.766*** − 0.739*** − 0.774*** − 0.813*** − 0.835***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Latitude − 0.953*** − 1.363*** − 1.616*** − 0.792*** − 1.179*** − 1.342*** − 0.792*** − 1.324*** − 1.383***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DemAge 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FrankRom 0.014 0.000 − 0.013 0.034 0.028 0.007 0.000 − 0.004 − 0.036
(0.607) (0.987) (0.608) (0.210) (0.328) (0.792) (0.993) (0.888) (0.200)
R2 0.580 0.598 0.660 0.603 0.612 0.667 0.562 0.598 0.618
F- test all 36.289 39.038 48.537 38.888 40.422 50.183 32.840 38.119 40.407
F- test gov 13.931 11.658 14.543 11.694 9.790 23.261 9.690 6.266 13.142
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Hall and Jones’s (1999) variables. Our models are estimated on all sets of instruments to 
ensure that the results are robust.
3.1.2  Heckman correction estimation
Another strategy in testing for possible endogenous relationships in the causal direction, as 
is also utilized by PT, is the Heckman correction procedure. With that method, a potential 
selection bias in the observations that are utilized in the regression analysis is controlled 
for by adjusting estimates for a possible correlation between the random elements in mac-
roeconomic outcomes and the selection of constitutional provisions. In the irst stage of 
a Heckman correction, a probit regression is estimated on constitutional selection. Simi-
lar to PT, we enter dummy variables for the date on which the country’s constitution was 
established, the age of democracy, ‘cultural inluences’ on the population (the proportion 
of people who speak English or another European language), and the country’s latitude.
3.2  Economic growth and volatility
Table 4 presents panel regression results estimating the impact of the form of government 
on rates of annual GDP growth, utilizing generalized least squares with random efects. 
We incorporate standard control variables in line with Barro (2007). For each regression 
speciication, three separate measures are entered to represent the form of government: a 
tripartite variable set equal to 0.5 for countries classiied in BG as semi-presidential, 1 if 
presidential, and 0 if parliamentary; a second speciication using the ‘semi-presidential’ 
and ‘presidential’ classiications from BG as dummy variables; and a similar speciication 
using the data from PT, as discussed in Sect. 2.2.
The relevant control variables comprise InitialGDP, which represents the natural loga-
rithm of a country’s GDP per capita; Education, measured by the log of the average num-
ber of years of the population’s educational attainment; Fertility and LifeExp, measured by 
the log of the number of births per woman and life expectancy measured at birth, respec-
tively; GovtSize, deined as the ratio of total government spending to GDP; and ExRateVol, 
measured as the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate between the domestic 
currency and the US dollar. The irst four of those variables are measured at the start of 
the panel period, whereas the inal two are taken as averages over the full sample. Table 4 
presents estimation results from three sets of empirical speciications: one with no control 
variables; one for a benchmark speciication wherein the control variables are composed of 
InitialGDP and Education; and an extended set incorporating all further control variables.
The estimation results in Table  4 point to a clear association between constitutional 
rules and economic growth: the average growth rate of GDP is slower under presidential 
regimes by between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points (consistent with the results from Table 2 
and the top left-hand panel in Fig. 1); the efect is statistically signiicant at the 1% level in 
the six speciications with no and less than a full set of control variables, and at 5% when 
additional controls are entered. Note that at low levels of initial income, Table 4 suggests 
that presidential countries will grow faster, consistent with the convergence hypothesis; 
that is, lower (initial) GDP per capita is associated with faster growth rates such that poorer 
countries catch up with richer ones. Indeed, if estimations are performed on regressions 
similar to those in Table  4 without controlling for initial GDP, statistically insigniicant 
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 3 Table 4  Economic growth and the form of government
Dependent variable is the mean annual GDP per capita growth rates over the panel time horizon. Coeicients are estimates from random efects regression using panels 
between 1965–1979, 1980–1994 and 1995–2009 including time dummies and a constant (not presented). Results from columns (1), (4) and (7) present those using the scale 
variable of the form of government using BG, in columns (2), (5) and (8) dummy variables for both types of government from the BG, and similar in (3), (6) and (9) for presi-
dential data from PT. A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. P values of t-statistics are in paren-
theses where heteroskedastic clustered robust standard errors have been used
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pres − 0.814*** − 0.868*** − 0.916*** − 1.173*** − 1.153*** − 1.198*** − 0.593** − 0.622** − 0.691**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042)
Semi-pres 0.236 − 0.017 0.151
(0.581) (0.959) (0.623)
Maj − 0.562* − 0.502* − 0.380 − 0.094 − 0.066 − 0.134
(0.070) (0.090) (0.215) (0.734) (0.814) (0.657)
InitialGDP − 0.818*** − 0.794*** − 0.800*** − 1.371*** − 1.375*** − 1.375***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 3.850*** 3.863*** 2.518*** 0.420 0.622 0.827
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.666) (0.536) (0.446)
Fertility − 0.697*** − 0.644*** − 0.509**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.021)
LifeExp 0.055* 0.062* 0.046
(0.090) (0.055) (0.338)
Openness 0.006** 0.006** 0.008***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.007)
GovtSize − 2.653 − 2.927 − 4.094***
(0.170) (0.144) (0.025)
ExRateVol 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.568) (0.435) (0.175)
R2 0.176 0.178 0.210 0.294 0.292 0.339 0.390 0.389 0.429
N 263 263 210 205 205 169 204 204 169
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12 More generally, suppose that a dependent variable (Yt) is a function of two independent variables 
(X1,t and X2,t) such that Yt= α + β1X1,t+ β2X2,t+ εt is estimated; and X2,t also is a function of X1,t such that 
X2,t= λ + γX1,t+ et. Substituting the second speciication into the irst one yields Yt= [α + β2λ] + X1,t 
[β1 + β2γ] + [β2X2,tet+ εt]. It therefore follows that the impact of X1,t on Yt is both direct (estimated through 
β1) and indirect (through the efect X1,t has on X2,t). If Y is economic growth, X1 our measure of the form of 
government and X2 (initial GDP), where β1 < 0, β2 < 0 and γ < 0, then the total estimated impact of presiden-
tial regimes on economic growth is smaller than the direct efect.
coeicients are attached to the form of government variable in columns (7)–(9).12 Presi-
dential regimes are associated with lower levels of education, life expectancy, trade open-
ness and higher fertility rates (with statistically signiicant correlation coeicients), all of 
which are also associated with slower economic growth. Collinearity explains why the esti-
mated coeicients attached to the form of government variable become smaller in Table 4 
in speciications (7)–(9) than in speciications (3)–(6), along with why statistical signii-
cance declines. The results from Table 4 support the convergence hypothesis: conditional 
on the level of initial GDP per capita: countries with presidential regimes grow slower than 
those with parliamentary ones.13
Table 5 presents results from estimating the efect of the form of government on eco-
nomic growth using instrumental variables and Heckman correction techniques, as dis-
cussed in Sect.  3.1. For all nine speciications, the sizes of the estimated coeicients of 
interest increase for both the instrumental variable and Heckman correction techniques. 
Furthermore, the coeicients are estimated more precisely and are statistically signiicant. 
Presidential regimes exhibit slower economic growth, all else equal.
We repeat the same exercise to examine the impact of regime type on growth volatil-
ity, deined as standard deviations in the rates of annual output growth. The control vari-
ables entered into this speciication are the same as those above, with additional variables 
measuring democracy (Polity) taken from the Polity IV database, and the volatility of trade 
openness (OpenVol). As can be seen from Table 6, no statistically signiicant association 
between regime type and the volatility of economic growth emerges in our regressions; 
these results reconcile with those from Table 2. The same holds true for the electoral sys-
tem, except in two speciications, wherein majoritarian electoral regimes are estimated to 
result in less output volatility. When performing comparable analysis as in Table 6 using 
instrumental variables and the Heckman correction, similar results prevail: a statistically 
insigniicant relationship between the form of government and output growth volatility is 
estimated (not reported).
3.3  Inlation and its volatility
We now turn to the potential inluence of the form of government on inlation performance 
(its rate and volatility). We estimate the speciication in (1) wherein the dependent vari-
able is the mean of the transformed GDP delator. The GDP delator, π, obtained from 
the World Bank, is transformed using π/(1 + π) to remove the impact of high inlation 
outliers (as identiied in Cukierman et al. 1992): entering the raw inlation igures would 
weight unduly a few outliers of very high inlation rates. In line with the existing empirical 
work on inlation, the speciications share common control variables InitialGDP, Open-
ness and ExRateVol. In addition to those controls, we enter a measure irst proposed and 
developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) of central bank independence (CBI), for which more 
13 Similarly, PT ind that presidential regimes have smaller governments. If regressions are estimated drop-
ping GovtSize, we ind quantitatively similar results.
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Table 5  Economic growth: instrumental variable and Heckman correction speciications
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation 
results for the variables of interest. Results similar to those presented in Table 4 now performing those procedures discussed in Sect. 3.1. ‘Sargan-Hansen’ refers to results 
from an over-identiication test where the null hypothesis is that all instruments are jointly valid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental variables
Pres − 1.168*** − 1.197*** − 1.217*** − 2.333*** − 2.139*** − 2.076*** − 1.432*** − 1.365*** − 1.505***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Semi-pres 0.305 − 0.151 0.124
(0.330) (0.708) (0.676)
Sargan-Hansen 0.140 0.240 0.171 0.385 0.527 0.529 0.296 0.625 0.435
Heckman correction
Pres − 1.010*** − 1.041*** − 1.343*** − 1.217*** − 1.243*** − 1.234*** − 0.640*** − 0.701*** − 0.806***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.010) (0.003)
Semi-pres 0.236 0.093 0.070
(0.476) (0.771) (0.816)
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independence is anticipated to lead to more favorable inlation outcomes. That variable is 
reserved for the extended regression speciication owing to data availability.
Consistent with our earlier results, presidential regimes are associated with inferior out-
comes: countries governed by presidential systems experience inlation rates that are on 
average more than four percentage points higher than for those governed by parliamentary 
regimes.14 That efect is consistent across all speciications and is larger when the measure 
of central bank independence is entered. The signiicances of the coeicients attached to 
the form of government variable are weakened by the electoral rule, the latter being found 
to be more consistently and strongly statistically signiicant. Countries with majoritarian 
electoral rules are estimated to achieve lower inlation rates, by between six and nine per-
centage points, than those with proportional representation. The weakening of the form-
of-government results originates in considerable collinearity: parliamentary countries are 
more likely than presidential ones to adopt majoritarian voting systems. Similarly, as dis-
cussed in Sect. 3.2, presidential regimes and initial GDP are correlated negatively. Estimat-
ing the speciications by dropping InitialGDP leads to larger and more statistically signii-
cant detrimental efects of presidential regimes.
Table 6  Volatility of economic growth and the form of government
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. Dependent variable is the standard deviation in annual growth rates of GDP per capita over the 
panel time horizon; all else is as deined earlier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pres 0.294 0.252 0.165 − 0.079 − 0.052 − 0.246 − 0.079 − 0.059 − 0.359
(0.409) (0.475) (0.584) (0.837) (0.893) (0.498) (0.823) (0.868) (0.318)
Semi-
pres
0.724* 0.415 0.475
(0.076) (0.354) (0.239)
Maj − 0.307 − 0.245 − 0.568** − 0.302 − 0.236 − 0.614**
(0.433) (0.520) (0.015) (0.413) (0.519) (0.010)
Initial-
GDP
− 0.137 − 0.103 − 0.196 − 0.037 − 0.001 − 0.172
(0.356) (0.467) (0.211) (0.830) (0.996) (0.329)
Open-
ness
0.013** 0.013* 0.008** 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.047) (0.057) (0.033) (0.875) (0.964) (0.715)
Polity − 0.145*** − 0.144*** − 0.105*** − 0.129*** − 0.127*** − 0.105***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Open-
Vol
0.086*** 0.088*** 0.046*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.089)
Govt-
Size
2.369 2.139 − 0.411
(0.312) (0.345) (0.847)
ExRat-
eVol
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.679) (0.644) (0.752)
R2 0.096 0.096 0.055 0.161 0.159 0.145 0.168 0.170 0.173
n 281 281 251 246 246 194 246 246 194
14 Note that in order to convert point estimates for the marginal impact of the form of government (x say) 
on the transformed variable for inlation, where y = π/(1 + π), one must use the chain rule to get ∂π/∂x = ∂π/
∂y × ∂y/∂x = β/(1 − y)2, where β is the coeicient from the regression and where the mean of y (i.e., 0.0924) 
is applied.
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Table 7  Inlation and the form of government
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Dependent variable is the average for the period of 
π/(1 + π) where π is the annual GDP delator; all else is as deined earlier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pres 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.029* 0.029 0.034* 0.051** 0.052** 0.050**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.102) (0.096) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028)
Semi-pres 0.032** 0.003 0.020
(0.040) (0.858) (0.285)
Maj − 0.031** − 0.033** − 0.050*** − 0.054*** − 0.055*** − 0.078***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
InitialGDP − 0.014** − 0.015** − 0.022** − 0.024*** − 0.024*** − 0.027***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009)
Openness − 0.001*** − 0.001*** 0.000** − 0.001** − 0.001** − 0.001**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025)
ExRateVol 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.030) (0.052) (0.909) (0.611) (0.580) (0.413)
CBI − 0.095* − 0.094* − 0.120**
(0.085) (0.092) (0.033)
R2 0.178 0.177 0.211 0.189 0.188 0.217 0.238 0.238 0.258
N 262 262 210 234 234 148 174 174 145
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Table  8 presents results when instrumental variables and Heckman correction esti-
mation techniques are applied. Similar to the results in Table 5, the point estimates with 
respect to the instrumental variable method increase; the coeicients are estimated with 
more precision and more statistical signiicance.15 The results from the Heckman correc-
tion procedure are in line with those from generalized least squares, although they are 
again estimated with more precision. In general, the results from Table  8 are consistent 
with (if not stronger than) those from Table 7.
Table 9 performs the same exercise for inlation volatility. Parallel to the indings above, 
inlation is more volatile under both presidential regimes and proportional electoral sys-
tems; however, whereas the results for the voting rule remain signiicant, those for the form 
of government are less consistently signiicant. This result, again, arises from the presence 
of collinearity between the form of government and the voting rule: when the regression 
is run without the latter, the former is statistically signiicant to at least 5% in all spec-
iications. That is, the constitutional framework of a country and the volatility of inla-
tion are correlated, and the voting rule explains inlation volatility better than the form of 
governance.16
Table 10 presents corresponding results using instrumental variables and Heckman cor-
rection estimation. Similar to above, point estimates are larger using those techniques, and 
are estimated with more precision, statistically signiicant at the 95% conidence level in all 
but two of the speciications. In sum, the evidence suggests that countries with presidential 
regimes have higher inlation rates and more volatility in those rates.
Table 8  Inlation: instrumental variable and Heckman correction speciications
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. 
Results similar to those presented in Table 7 now performing those procedures outlined in Sect. 3.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental variables
Pres 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.090*** 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.075** 0.071** 0.063**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.158) (0.164) (0.026) (0.037) (0.031)
Semi-pres 0.062* 0.011 0.024
(0.055) (0.701) (0.392)
Sargan-
Hansen
0.508 0.501 0.254 0.107 0.101 0.121 0.248 0.276 0.106
Heckman correction
Pres 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.030* 0.022* 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.031**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.070) (0.051) (0.064) (0.006) (0.001) (0.034)
Semi-pres 0.017*** 0.000 0.008
(0.007) (0.987) (0.381)
15 Note that some of the increases in the sizes of these coeicients is explained by the smaller sample size 
owing to the availability of observations on the instruments (sample sizes are on average 24% smaller in 
Table 8 than in Table 7). When speciications using generalized least squares are run on this smaller sam-
ple, point estimates increase on average by 14%; that is less than the increase in the instrumental variables 
approach, but accounts for some of the diference.
16 Similarly, dropping InitialGDP from the speciications in Table 9 also returns larger point estimates for 
the efect of presidential regimes on the variability of inlation, all statistically signiicant at the 95% coni-
dence level or higher.
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Table 9  Inlation volatility and the form of government
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Dependent variable is the standard deviation for the period 
of π/(1 + π) where π is the annual rate of inlation; all variables are as deined earlier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pres 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.023* 0.022* 0.013
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.198) (0.175) (0.369) (0.066) (0.075) (0.353)
Semi-pres 0.039*** 0.019 0.029*
(0.004) (0.157) (0.067)
Maj − 0.023** − 0.020** − 0.030*** − 0.024** − 0.021* − 0.039***
(0.011) (0.033) (0.007) (0.034) (0.06) (0.002)
InitialGDP − 0.016*** − 0.015*** − 0.017** − 0.021*** − 0.020*** − 0.019**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015)
Openness − 0.038*** − 0.039*** − 0.023 − 0.023 − 0.027 − 0.025
(0.002) (0.001) (0.100) (0.217) (0.142) (0.178)
OpenVol 0.240*** 0.246*** 0.106 0.192* 0.207* 0.136
(0.003) (0.003) (0.227) (0.066) (0.050) (0.175)
ExRateVol 0.001 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.002
(0.193) (0.153) (0.166) (0.339) (0.465) (0.128)
CBI − 0.050* − 0.051* − 0.072**
(0.093) (0.081) (0.016)
R2 0.122 0.128 0.149 0.142 0.145 0.148 0.231 0.222 0.212
N 262 262 210 234 234 173 174 174 145
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3.4  Income inequality
We next turn to the relationship between the form of government and income inequality, a 
topic of considerable contemporary concern. Income inequality is shown to be an impor-
tant factor underlying both economic and political instability, with clear implications for 
overall macroeconomic performance (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti 1996, among 
others). When combined with steadily rising income inequality almost everywhere over 
the past three decades and its record levels at present (see, for example, OECD 2015), we 
argue that it is important to understand whether the form of government plays any role in 
distributive outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the irst to examine that 
relationship formally.17
The estimation results in Table 11 point to a clear link between the form of government 
and income inequality: presidential regimes are associated with Gini coeicients between 
12 and 24% larger than those of parliamentary regimes. These results reconcile with those 
from Table 2 and Fig. 1. Similar to indings reported above, dropping variables measuring 
initial GDP, the size of government, or both, provide results quantitatively similar to those 
in Table 11. Finally, Table 12 presents similar results from applying instrumental variables 
and Heckman correction procedures. When those techniques are adopted, point estimates 
for the coeicients of interest increase in magnitude and are estimated with more precision.
Overall, our results in this section establish that macroeconomic outcomes in parlia-
mentary regimes are superior to those under presidential systems. We ind that growth is 
faster, that inlation is slower and less volatile, and income is distributed more equally in 
parliamentary systems.
Table 10  Inlation volatility: instrumental variable and Heckman correction speciications
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. 
Results similar to those presented in Table 9 now performing those procedures outlined in Sect. 3.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental variables
Pres 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.048*** 0.043** 0.047*** 0.026 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.028*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.006) (0.133) (0.008) (0.005) (0.100)
Semi-pres 0.043* 0.039* 0.037*
(0.066) (0.080) (0.070)
Sargan-
Hansen
0.134 0.138 0.150 0.376 0.407 0.141 0.345 0.364 0.137
Heckman correction
Pres 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.021** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Semi-pres 0.012** 0.013*** 0.021**
(0.130) (0.000) (0.034)
17 Shugart (1999) is the only other study of which we know that links regime type to income inequality, 
albeit informally. By listing the sample countries according to their income inequalities, Shugart (1999) 
points to a strong tendency for incomes to be distributed more unequally under presidential regimes. Gre-
gorini and Longoni (2009) look at the role of income inequality in the relationship between electoral rules 
and public consumption spending, inding that income inequality raises such spending in countries with 
proportional electoral systems, but has no efect in nations with majoritarian electoral rules. Gregorini and 
Longoni do not consider the potential implications of the form of government on income inequality.
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Table 11  Inequality and the form of government
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. Dependent variable is the log of the mean Gini coeicient for income inequality over the 
period of the panel; all else is as deined earlier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pres 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.238*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.208*** 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.211***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Semi-
pres
− 0.011 − 0.012 − 0.007
(0.835) (0.796) (0.873)
Maj 0.077** 0.061 0.023 0.067* 0.056 0.014
(0.037) (0.103) (0.593) (0.076) (0.126) (0.747)
GovtSize 0.040 0.048 0.002 0.133 0.175 0.152
(0.200) (0.134) (0.960) (0.309) (0.188) (0.272)
Openness − 0.003 0.001 − 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.939) (0.971) (0.594) (0.995) (0.916) (0.275)
Initial-
GDP
− 0.022 − 0.029 0.034 0.016 0.013 0.083*
(0.560) (0.453) (0.408) (0.737) (0.788) (0.060)
Initial-
GDP2
− 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.004*** − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.005***
(0.437) (0.422) (0.008) (0.312) (0.300) (0.001)
Human-
Cap
− 0.071* − 0.074* − 0.087*
(0.081) (0.072) (0.091)
Inlation 0.007 0.004 − 0.002
(0.942) (0.972) (0.978)
R2 0.125 0.119 0.182 0.197 0.200 0.143 0.302 0.304 0.182
N 269 269 246 209 209 167 192 192 164
Table 12  Inequality: instrumental variable and Heckman correction speciications
A standard star convention is used, with *, ** and *** representing signiicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. Instrumental variable and Heckman correction estimation results for the variables of interest. 
Results similar to those presented in Table 11 now performing those procedures outlined in Sect. 3.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental variables
Pres 0.409*** 0.402*** 0.351*** 0.582*** 0.564*** 0.420*** 0.478*** 0.461*** 0.391***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Semi-pres 0.015 0.220 0.144
(0.886) (0.112) (0.158)
Sargan-
Hansen
0.009 0.082 0.049 0.634 0.721 0.307 0.582 0.629 0.242
Heckman correction
Pres 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.213*** 0.226*** 0.214***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Semi-pres − 0.017 − 0.032 − 0.030
(0.726) (0.414) (0.431)
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3.5  Sensitivity
We test the robustness of our results by entering a number of diferent explanatory variables 
in the speciications reported above. Both the level of democracy (Polity) and the stock of 
democratic experience (the number of consecutive years the country has been judged to be 
democratic, DemAge) are included in one of our robustness checks. In another, the continental 
indicator variables of PT are entered into the speciications to test for the role of geography; as 
Fig. 3 demonstrates, presidential regimes tend be concentrated in South America and Africa. 
A variable measuring the proportion of the population that practices a protestant religion also 
was tested, following the existing studies of religiosity and macroeconomic performance (see, 
for example, Becker and Woessmann 2009). In all cases, entering those variables into our pre-
vious speciications had limited efect on the quantitative estimates and statistical signiicances 
of the link between the form of government and macroeconomic outcomes. Estimates from 
these speciications can be found in the supplementary material ("Appendix 2").
We also re-estimated the instrumental variable and the Heckman correction procedures 
using the constitutional timing variables from Rockey (2012) (see Sect. 3.1 for a discussion 
of those variables) instead of those applied in PT. The re-estimations returned results simi-
lar to those presented above for both the instrumental variable and Heckman techniques. 
The instrumental variable speciications also were re-estimated with generalized methods 
of moments, which again yielded results similar to those above, with the same conclusions 
reached. See the supplementary materials ("Appendix 2") for those results.
4  Conclusions
This paper examines the link between the form of government (presidential or parliamen-
tary) and macroeconomic performance using data from a large number of countries over the 
1950–2015 period. Our set of measures include output growth and its volatility, inlation and 
its volatility, as well as income inequality. We ind clear diferences in outcomes under the two 
regimes studied. More speciically, we ind that presidential regimes consistently are associ-
ated with inferior macroeconomic outcomes. Output growth is estimated to be between 0.6 
and 1.2 percentage points lower, inlation is at least four percentage points higher and income 
is 12 to 24% more unequal under presidential systems than under parliamentary regimes.
Why do presidential regimes produce worse economic outcomes than parliamentary 
systems? To answer this question, it is crucial to understand the wider institutional context 
in which the two systems operate. It has long been recognized that institutions, whether 
political, legal or economic, play a key role on economic outcomes through aggregating 
conlicting interests into public policy and imposing constraints on economic behaviour. 
One can therefore envisage that constitutional rules shape economic outcomes through 
their role on the form of institutions and, in turn, through the inluence of institutions on 
economic policy and hence economic performance. We believe that a systematic analysis 
of institutions across the two forms of government should form a key part of the attempt in 
answering this question and hence is an important task for future research.
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Appendix 1
See Table 13 and Fig. 3.
Table 13  Data appendix (variables in order of appearance)
Dependent variables
GDP growth Annual growth rate of GDP per capita; data obtained from the World Bank
GDP growth volatility Standard deviation of ‘GDP growth’ (above) over the panel period
Inlation GDP delator as an annual percentage taken from the World Bank
Inlation volatility Standard deviation of ‘Inlation’ above over the panel period
Gini coeicient Gini coeicient measure of income inequality; data obtained from World Income 
Inequality Database
Independent variables
Pres A measure determining if a country is operating under a presidential regime; data 
obtained from both BG and PT. A more detailed discussion of the deinitions 
applied can be found in Sect. 2.2
Semi-Pres A binary measure determining if a country is operating under a semi-presidential 
regime; data obtained from BG. A more detailed discussion of the deinition 
applied can be found in Sect. 2.2
Maj A binary measure indicating if a country is operating under a majoritarian voting 
system; data obtained from BG
Initial GDP Log of GDP per capita (expressed in current United States Dollars) at the start of 
the panel period; data obtained from the World Bank
Education Metric of education measured as the average total number of years of educational 
attainment; data obtained from Barro and Lee (2013)
Fertility Log of the fertility rate expressed as the number of births per woman; data 
obtained from the World Bank
LifeExp Log of the life expectancy at birth in years; data obtained from the World Bank
Openness The sum of imports and exports expressed as a fraction of GDP; data obtained 
from the World Bank
GovtSize Share of government consumption in total GDP; data obtained from Penn World 
Tables
ExRateVol Standard deviation of the exchange rate expressed as a fraction against the US 
dollar over the panel period; data obtained from Penn World Tables
Polity Measure of democracy within a given country on a (− 10,10) scale; higher values 
relating to higher degrees of democracy and lower values indicating greater 
degrees of autocracy. Data obtained from the Polity IV Project
OpenVol Standard deviation of ‘Openness’ (above) over the panel period
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Table 13  (continued)
Independent variables
CBI Measure of central bank independence obtained from Cukierman et al. (1992), 
Polillo and Guillén (2005) and Crowe and Meade (2008), all of whom use the 
same methodology
HumanCap Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and returns to 
education; data obtained from the Penn World Table
Instrumental variables
con2150, con5180, 
con81
Dummy variables measuring the date of when the constitution within a country 
was established, using dummy variables for periods between 1921 and 1950, 
between 1950 and 81, and beyond 1981. Variables obtained from PT as well 
as Rockey (2012) who updates these to consider both when a constitution was 
promulgated and when free elections were held under the constitution for the 
irst time
EurFrac Fraction of the country which speaks one of the main European languages; data 
obtained from Persson and Tabellini (2003)
EngFrac Fraction of the country which speaks English; data obtained from PT
Latitude Latitude of the country’s capital city; data obtained from PT
DemAge Measure of the length of time in which the Polity score (see above) has been 
positive nonstop; that is, how long a country has been consistently democratic
FrankRom Predicted trade share of an economy, based on a gravity model of international 
trade that only uses a country’s population and geographical features adapted 
from Frankel and Romer (1996); data obtained from Hall and Jones (1999)
Institutional variables
Polity See above in dependent variables
DemAge See above in instrumental variables
PartDem A measure of the level to which democracy is participatory within a country; data 
obtained from Varieties of Democracy database
ElecDem A measure of the level to which the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved; data 
obtained from Varieties of Democracy database
MediaFree The degree to which media is free from government; data obtained from Varieties 
of Democracy database
ParComp A variable which measures the extent to which alternative preferences for policy 
and leadership can be pursued in the political arena; data obtained from Polity IV 
Project
RuleOfLaw A variable measuring agents perceived conidence in the rule of law of a country, 
in particular over contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts; 
data obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
Xconst Measure of constraints on chief executive where lower numbers represent fewer 
constraints; data obtained from the Polity IV Project.
PolCon Measure of the feasibility of change in policy given the structure of a nation’s 
political institutions and the preference of the actors that inhabit them; data 
obtained from the POLCON database
Parties Efective number of electoral parties in an election where an average is taken over 
the time period of the panel; data obtained from BG
EthPol A measure of the polarisation of ethnicity in a given country; data obtained from 
Reynal-Querol and Montalvo (2005)
SocPart A measure of society participation through the degree to which policy makers 
consult society; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database
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Fig. 3  Presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. Map illustrating parliamentary, presiden-
tial and semi-presidential regimes using BG classiication for government structures
Institutional variables
CivLib A measure to the degree in which civil liberties are respected in a country; data 
obtained from Varieties of Democracy database
FreeSpeech A measure to the level in which individuals have freedom of speech within a coun-
try; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database
FreeExp A variable measuring the level of respect governments give to media and press 
freedoms; data obtained from Varieties of Democracy database
Table 13  (continued)
Appendix 2: Supplementary materials: sensitivity results
The role of democracy
We test the robustness of our results to including both the level of democracy (Polity) and 
the stock of democratic experience (DemAge). Estimates for the variables of interest are 
presented in panel A of Table 14, which reports results using the eighth speciication in 
Tables  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The two indicators of democracy themselves are 
estimated to have signiicant impacts on the volatility of GDP growth as well as on inla-
tion and its volatility, with more democratic and older democracies predicted to inluence 
those outcomes favorably. Despite this, as can be seen from Table 14, entering those vari-
ables has very little efect on the quantitative estimates and statistical signiicances of the 
link between the form of government and macroeconomic outcomes (a conclusion that also 
holds across diferent speciications, not just the eight from Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
and 12; those results are not reported).
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The role of geography
As demonstrated in Fig. 3, presidential regimes tend be concentrated in South America and 
Africa. In order to test the robustness of results to geographical location, we apply PT’s 
grouping and enter dummy variables for countries belonging to the OECD, along with 
regional indicators for nations in Latin and South America, Africa, and Southern and East 
Asian countries (leaving a benchmark group containing non-OECD European countries 
and those from the Middle East). In panel B of Table 14 we present results using the eight 
speciications in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, now including these regional dummy 
variables.
Given the presence of collinearity between the regional dummy variables and the type 
of government, the statistical signiicance of our empirical results weaken. Lesser statisti-
cal signiicance is most noteworthy for the relationship between presidential regimes and 
economic growth: coeicient estimates change from being statistically signiicant at the 
5% level (Table 4) to being insigniicant, although the partial correlation remains negative. 
In all other cases, however, statistically signiicant results reported in earlier analyses are 
maintained and, hence, are robust to including regional dummy variables (that conclusion 
again holds in unreported estimates across diferent speciications, not just the eight one 
from Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12).
Table 14  Regression results 
from robustness tests
Robustness results when including additional variables in the analysis. 
Results presented from column (8) in Tables  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
and 12  where only the estimated coeicients of the variable of inter-
est have been presented. Similar results are obtained when using any 
of the nine speciications from Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 
(not reported). In panel A ‘Polity’ and ‘DemAge’ are included in the 
speciication; in panel B the regional dummy variables from PT are 
included in the speciication; the speciications in panel C include the 
proportion of the population practicing a protestant faith; and panel D 
presents instrumental variable results using generalized methods of 
moments
Growth GrowVol Inlation InfVol Inequality
A. The stock and low of democracy
Pres − 0.638** − 0.046 0.051** 0.024* 0.178***
(0.031) (0.895) (0.019) (0.061) (0.000)
B. Geographic indicators
Pres − 0.170 − 0.208 0.038* 0.025** 0.091*
(0.613) (0.544) (0.095) (0.037) (0.061)
C. The degree of Protestantism
Pres − 0.638** − 0.046 0.051** 0.024* 0.178***
(0.031) (0.895) (0.019) (0.061) (0.000)
D. General methods of moments estimation
Pres − 1.505*** 0.013 0.060* 0.028** 0.328***
(0.000) (0.960) (0.059) (0.031) (0.000)
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The role of Protestantism
We test the robustness of our results further by including the proportion of the population 
that practices a protestant religion, following the existing studies of religiosity and macro-
economic performance (see, for example, Becker and Woessmann 2009). The protestant 
population percentage is itself statistically signiicant and enters with a negative sign in 
regressions for which either inlation volatility or income inequality is the dependent varia-
ble. The impact of the form of government again remains unchanged (panel C in Table 14).
Further sensitivity checks
We also re-estimated the instrumental variable and Heckman correction procedures using 
the constitutional timing variables from Rockey (2012) (see Sect. 3.1 for a discussion of 
those variables) instead of those applied in PT (2003). These provide similar results to 
those presented above for both instrumental variable and Heckman techniques. We fur-
ther perform the instrumental variable estimations using generalized methods of moments, 
which again provides similar results to those above, with the same conclusions reached 
(panel D in Table 14).
We have also explored the sensitivity of our indings to using panels still over ifteen 
years but starting in 1960 (as opposed to 1965 above), leading to quantitatively similar 
results for all dependent variables in the analysis. Point estimates can be larger, especially 
for growth and growth volatility coeicients; however, the fewer observations also leads to 
slightly weaker levels of signiicance.18 The results from above are also not sensitive to ten-
year panels starting in 1960, with similar results obtained from these time periods.
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